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CASE COMMENTS
THE DOLPHIN DELIVER Y CASE:
THE APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER TO PRIVATE ACTION*
Does the Charter o Rights and Freedoms apply to private action? Does it
apply to the courts? Does it apply to the common law? The Supreme Court of
Canada in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Dolphin Deliv-
ery (1986)1 has addressed each of these three fundamental questions.
The facts of the case were these. Dolphin Delivery was a courier com-
pany. The Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, which repres-
ented the employees of another courier company, Purolator Courier, threa-
tened to picket the premises of Dolphin Delivery. The purpose of the picketing
was to publicize an industrial dispute between the union and Purolator.
Dolphin Delivery was not a party to that dispute, thus the picketing of
Dolphin Delivery's premises would have been "secondary picketing."
Dolphin Delivery sought and obtained from the courts of British Colum-
bia an injunction to restrain the union from picketing Dolphin's premises.
The ground upon which the injunction was granted was that secondary
picketing in the circumstances of this case would constitute the common law
tort of inducing a breach of contract. There was a prohibition on secondary
picketing in the B.C. Labour Code, but this statutory prohibition did not
apply, because the applicable labour law was federal (in view of Purolator's
interprovincial operations), and the Canada Labour Code was silent on
secondary picketing, leaving it to be regulated by the common law.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, the union argued that the injunction
ought to be set aside on the ground that it limited freedom of expression,
guaranteed under s.2(b) of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada,
sitting as a seven-judge bench, held unanimously that the injunction should
stand. McIntyre J., with the concurrence of Dickson C.J., Estey, Chouinard
and Le Dain JJ., wrote the principal opinion, holding that the Charter did not
apply to private action of the kind involved in this case. Beetz and Wilson JJ.,
who wrote separate concurring opinions, each agreed with McIntyre J.'s
opinion on the applicability of the Charter. On that issue, therefore, the
seven-judge bench was unanimous.
I. THE DOLPHIN DELIVERY DECISION
A. APPLICATION TO PRIVATE ACTION
The first and most basic point settled by Dolphin Delivery is that s.32 of
* This article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Spring Convention of The
Advocates' Society on April 3, 1987.
1 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
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the Charter is an exhaustive statement of who is bound by the Charter.
Section 32 provides as follows:
This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters
within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the
Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all
matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.
The references in s.32 to "the Parliament and government of Canada" and
"the legislature and government of each province" make plain that the
Charter applies to "governmental action" (or "state action," as the Ameri-
cans call it). But s.32 does not say that the Charter applies only to govern-
mental action. This omission has led some commentators to argue that s.32
serves a function similar to the common statutory provision that "this Act
binds the Crown."2 On this argument, s.32 is intended to make clear that
governments are bound, but is not intended to exclude private action, and the
Charter should be interpreted as applying to private action. The underlying
assumption of the argument, of course, is that the values represented by the
Charter are so good, and their interpretation and enforcement by judges will
be so reliably benign, that the values ought to be imposed in the private as
well as the public realm. 3
In Dolphin Delivery, McIntyreJ. rejected the argument that the Charter
extended to the private realm. He held that s.32 was an exhaustive definition
of the actors bound by the Charter.4 This means that Canada has a govern-
mental action (or state action) restriction on the application of the Charter.
McIntyre J. did not give his reasons for reaching this important conclusion,
but, in my view, there are good reasons for reading the Charter in this way. I
think that it is the best reading of the (admittedly ambiguous) language of
the Charter, it is supported by the legislative history of the Charter; and it is
consistent with the "state action" limitation on the American Bill ofRights.5
Underlying these reasons, of course, is the assumption that there is a private
realm in which people are not obliged to subscribe to "state" virtues and into
which constitutional norms ought not to intrude.6
B. APPLICATION TO COURTS
The second point settled by Dolphin Delivery is that the Charter does not
apply to the courts. The union had argued that, even if the Charter did not
apply to private action, the injunction, that had in this case been issued by
the courts of British Columbia, supplied the necessary element of govern-
2 Dale Gibson, "The Charter of Rights and the Private Sector" (1982), 12 Man. L.J.
213.
3 For argument that the Charter applies to private action, see Manning, Rights,
Freedoms and the Courts (1983), at 115-126; Slattery, "Charter of Rights and
Freedoms - Does it bind private persons?" (1985), 53 Can. Bar Rev. 148; de Mon-
tigny, "Section 32 and Equality Rights" in Bayefsky and Eberts, Equality Rights
and the Charter of Rights (1985), ch. 13; Gibson, The Law of the Charter: General
Principles (1986), at 110-118.
4 Supra, note 1, at 598.
5 These points are elaborated in Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed., 1985),
at 675-677.
6 See Whyte, "Is the Private Sector affected by the Charter?" in Smith (ed.), Righting
the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights (1986), at 145, 149.
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mental action. McIntyre J. rejected this argument. He held that the word
"government" in s.32 meant only the executive branch of government, and
did not include the judicial branch: "The courts are bound by the Charter
[only] as they are bound by all law." 7 A court order was not governmental
action,8 and the injunction in this case was not subject to the Charter.
The holding that the Charter does not apply to the courts seems wrong to
me, partly, no doubt, because of a sentimental attachment to the text of my
book that argued the contrary. 9 Several provisions of the Charter imply that
the courts are bound by the Charter, for example, most of s.11 (rights of a
person charged with an offence), s.12 (cruel and unusual treatment or pun-
ishment), s.13 (self-incrimination), s.14 (interpreter) and s.19 (language in
court proceedings). One of these provisions has already been applied by the
Supreme Court of Canada itself in a fashion which seems to entail that the
courts are bound by the Charter. In Dubois v. The Queen (1985),10 the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the admission by a criminal court of
incriminating evidence given at an earlier trial was a breach of s.13 of the
Charter. Here, the action held to be a breach of the Charter was that of a
court, and the remedy ordered by the Supreme Court of Canada was a new
trial.
Dubois demonstrates that some of the provisions of the Charter can work
only on the basis that the courts are bound by the Charter. These provisions, I
suggest, supply a context in which it is reasonable to interpret the word
"government" in s.32 as including the judicial branch. The references in s.32
to "Parliament" and "legislature" could also be regarded as catching court
action, because courts are established (or continued) by statute, and their
powers to grant injunctions and make other orders are granted (or continued)
by statute. It is obvious that other statutory tribunals will have to comply
with the Charter. Why not the courts?
In the United States, it has been held that a court order is "state action"
to which the Bill of Rights applies. In Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)," the
Supreme Court of the United States held that an injunction was subject to the
Bill of Rights. The injunction had been issued by a state court to prohibit a
white landowner from selling his land to a black purchaser in breach of a
whites-only restrictive covenant that bound the land. It was clear that, if the
restrictive covenant had been voluntarily adhered to, there would have been
no state action and no breach of the Bill of Rights. But the state entered the
picture when the adjoining landowners, whose land was bound by a similar
covenant, obtained an injunction to enforce the covenant by divesting the
black purchaser of his title and restraining him from taking possession. The
Supreme Court of the United States held that the action of the state court in
issuing the injunction, supported as it was by "the full panoply of state
power,"' 12 was subject to the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court held that the
state court's injunction amounted to an order to discriminate on the basis of
race, which was contrary to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The injunction was therefore set aside as unconstitutional.
7 Supra, note 1, at 600.
8 Ibid.
9 Supra, note 4, at 672-674.
10o [198512 S.C.R. 350.
"(1948) 334 U.S. I.
12 Ibid., at 19.
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Shelley v. Kraemer is very similar to Dolphin Delivery. In Dolphin
Delivery, as in the American case, the government was implicated when the
plaintiff (Dolphin) invoked the coercive power of a court injunction to prevent
the picketers from exercising their freedom of expression. Breach of the
injunction would be a contempt of court, which would lead to the arrest and
imprisonment of the picketers. Are such enforcement measures by the police,
and by court and corrections officials, to be regarded merely as the actions of
a private security force? Surely, the American court was right to describe an
injunction as supported by "the full panoply of state power," and to charac-
terize it as state action.
I think that Shelley v. Kraemer was rightly decided, but I must acknowl-
edge that some eminent Amercian commentators do not agree with me.
Professor Tribe, for example, describes the reasoning as "peculiarly unper-
suasive," pointing out that the reasoning "would require individuals to con-
form their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as
almost always, the individuals might later seek the security of potential
judicial enforcement."' 13 Tribe shares McIntyre J.'s concern that the charac-
terization of a court order as governmental action would inevitably bring
some private action within the scope of the Charter.14 My difference with
McIntyre J. (and Tribe) concerns the appropriate point at where the line
should be drawn to mark the private realm that is unconstrained by the
Charter. At the point of judicial enforcement, I believe the plaintiff has
entered the public realm, and his or her court order ought to comply with the
Charter.
C. APPLICATION TO COMMON LAW: RATIO DECIDENDI
The third point that is probably settled by Dolphin Delivery is that the
Charter does not apply to the common law. The court injunction in Dolphin
Delivery was based on the common law that regulates relationships between
private parties: it was a rule of the common law that secondary picketing in
the circumstances of the case amounted to the tort of inducing a breach of
contract. (In this respect, Dolphin Delivery is unlike Shelley v. Kraemer,
where the injunction was based on a private agreement.) In Dolphin Deliv-
ery, therefore, it was argued that the general rule of the common law should
be regarded as governmental action. McIntyre J. rejected this argument. He
said: "Where . . . private party 'A' sues private party 'B' relying on the
common law and where no act of government is relied upon to support the
action, the Charter will not apply."' 5
Despite some confusing dicta which are discussed later in this article, it
seems to be part of the ratio decidendi of the case that the Charter does not
apply to the rules of the common law that regulate relationships between
private parties. The Supreme Court of the United States has decided this
issue the other way. The best-known case is New York Times v. Sullivan
(1963).16 In that case, it was held that the Bill of Rights' guarantees of
13 Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978), at 1155-1156. The best-known criticism
of the case is Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959),
73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, at 29-31.
14 McIntyre J. said at 600: "To regard a court order as an element of governmental
intervention necessary to invoke the Charter would, it seems to me, widen the scope
of Charter application to virtually all private litigation."
15 Ibid., at 603.
16 (1963) 376 U.S. 254.
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freedom of speech and of the press applied to the common law of defamation,
shielding a newspaper from tortious liability for defamatory criticism of a
public official, unless the criticism was actuated by malice. In this way, the
Bill of Rights modified the common law of Alabama by adding a new ingre-
dient to the tort of defamation, namely, malice, where the defamatory state-
ment took the form of political speech. There is an earlier American case that
is on all fours with Dolphin Delivery. In American Federation of Labor v.
Swing(1941), 17 the Supreme Court of the United States held that an injunc-
tion issued by a state court to restrain a union from secondary picketing was
an unconstitutional violation of the guarantee of freedom of speech. The
injunction was based on the common law, and the effect of the decision was to
modify the common law of the state of Illinois. 18
The decision in Dolphin Delivery means that New York Times v. Sulli-
van and American Federation of Labor v. Swing would have to be decided
differently in Canada. It also means that a recent decision of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia,1 9 holding that the common
law rule denying costs to a litigant unrepresented by counsel was a breach of
s.15 of the Charter, was wrongly decided. In each of these situations, if the
applicable legal rule had been contained in a statute instead of the common
law, the Charter would apply: the statute would unquestionably supply the
needed element of governmental action. This anomaly is starkly presented
by the facts of Dolphin Delivery itself. Because the prohibition on secondary
picketing had not been enacted in the Canada Labour Code, it remained a
matter of common law, and the Charter did not apply. But in most jurisdic-
tions, including British Columbia, the prohibition on secondary picketing
has been enacted in the Labour Code: in those jurisdictions, the Charter will
apply. It seems odd that the applicability of the Charter should turn on the
question whether the applicable law is a rule of the common law or a rule of
statute law. 20
In support of the Court's decision in Dolphin Delivery, it could be said
that the exclusion of private action from the operation of the Charter does
entail the exclusion of, at least, some of the common law. Since viewed in an
expansive sense, the common law could be said to authorize any private
action that is not prohibited by a positive rule of law. On this view, if I were to
refuse to permit Anglicans to enter my house, my refusal would be an act
authorized by the common law, and therefore subject to Charter review. This
line of reasoning would make the Charter applicable to all private activity.
The American courts have not allowed themselves to be beguiled down that
slippery slope. The Supreme Court of Canada is right to be concerned that the
application of the Charter to any rule of the common law would later require
17 (1941) 312 U.S. 321.
is Both these cases could be explained on the basis that in each case the court order
supplied the necessary governmental action. But the cases are accepted as author-
ity for the proposition they assert, namely, that the Bill of Rights applies to the
common law. "The general propostion that common law is state action is hardly
controversial": Tribe, supra, note 13, at 1168.
'9 McBeth v. Governor of Dalhousie College (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (N.S.A.D.).
20 See Slattery, "Does Dolphin Deliver?: The Charter's Relevance to Private Litiga-
tion" (1987), unpublished, wherein he criticizes the exclusion of the common law
from the Charter on the basis that in most Canadian jurisdictions the original
reception of the common law from England, and its continuing force, depends upon
a statute. He points out as well that the Civil Code of Quebec, which substitutes for
the common law in that civilian jurisdiction, is a statute.
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difficult distinctions to be drawn if a zone of private action is to be shielded
from Charter review.
D. APPLICATION TO COMMON LAW: OBITER DICTA
It is now necessary to describe some passages in McIntyre J.'s opinion
that discuss the applicability of the Charter to the common law, and that do
not sit comfortably with my account of the ratio decidendi of the case, which
is that the Charter does not apply to the rules of the common law that
regulate relationships between private parties.
Quite early in his opinion, McIntyre J. asks the question: "Does the
Charter apply to the common law?"2' His answer is that "there can be no
doubt that it does apply," 22 and he condemns the view "which would exclude
from Charter application the whole body of the common law which in great
part governs the rights and obligations of the individuals in society" as being
"wholly unrealistic." 23 These sweeping assertions are flatly contradictory to
the later holding that the Charter does not apply to the common law respect-
ing secondary picketing. McIntyre J. makes it plain that the Charter applies
to the common law "only in so far as the common law is the basis of some
governmental act which it is alleged infringes a guaranteed right or free-
dom." 24 This means that the Charter would apply when the Crown acts under
a prerogative power 25 or under another kind of common law power. 26 It is
questionable whether one ought to describe the Charter as applicable to the
common law in even these situations, where it is the presence of the govern-
mental actor, not the source of the actor's power, that makes the Charter
applicable. Yet, these seem to be the only situations in which the Charter
could be said to apply to the common law.
Another difficult passage is to be found near the end of the opinion where
McIntyre J. asserts that "the judiciary ought to apply and develop the
principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental
values enshrined in the Constitution," and he says that "in this sense,. . .the
Charter is far from irrelevant to private litigants whose disputes fall to be
decided at common law." 27 What is meant by the word "ought," which I have
emphasized in the foregoing passage? Probably, all that it means is that
where a common law rule is unsettled, the Court in developing the law in the
normal incremental way should take account of Charter values. This inter-
pretation best fits the ratio decidendi of the case, which denies the applicabil-
ity of the Charter to the rules of the common law that regulate private
relationships.
The word "ought" may be intended in a much stronger sense. 28 It could
mean that in private litigation the Court must measure each applicable
common law rule (however well settled) against the guarantees of the Char-
ter, and, if the rule is found to be inconsistent with a Charter guarantee,
inquire into the rule's justification under s.1. If this is what is contemplated,
21 Supra, note 1, at 592.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., at 593.
2 Ibid., at 599 (my emphasis).
2 So held in Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Charter applied
to government decision to allow U.S. missle testing in Canada).
2 For example, an exercise of proprietary or contractual powers by a government
would attract the Charter.
27 Supra, note 1, at 603. (my emphasis)
2 Slattery, supra, note 20.
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then for all practical purposes, the Charter does apply to the common law.
Moreover, this procedure is exactly the one that McIntyre J. followed in this
case. He considered the question whether picketing was a form of expression
guaranteed by s.2(b) of the Charter, and he concluded that it was, so that the
common law prohibition limited a Charter right. He then went on to examine
the question whether a prohibiton on secondary picketing was justified
under s.1, and he concluded that it was so justified. It followed that the
common law rule that crystallized in the court's injunction was not incon-
sistent with the Charter.
In view of the principal holding of the case, that the Charter does not
apply to the common law in the absence of a governmental actor, the discus-
sion of ss.2(b) and 1 of the Charter was all unnecessary. Indeed, McIntyre J.
said that his discussion of s.1 was unnecessary, 29 although he said nothing
similar about his discussion of s.2(b). But the fact that he discussed ss.2(b)
and 1 gives some credence to the strong version of the "ought" statement.
According to the strong version, the discussion of ss.2(b) and 1 was relevant,
because, if the common law had been found to be in violation of the Charter,
the Court would have been under a duty to modify it to make it consistent
with the Charter. This would have required the Court to set aside the
injunction.
If I were qualified to identify interpolations in an author's text, I would
be interested in the question of whether more than one hand had contributed
to McIntyre J.'s opinion. The inconsistencies and ambiguities are, with
respect, uncharacteristic, and suggest an imperfect knitting together of two
different opinions, one asserting and the other denying that the Charter
applies to the common law. This suspicion is reinforced by the extraordinary
delay in the issuance of the judgment; more than two years elapsed from the
end of the oral argument to the delivery of judgment. While it is obviously
highly desirable for the Court to achieve unanimity on an issue as basic as
the scope of the Charter's operation, in this case, it looks as though unanim-
ity has been purchased at the cost of clarity.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are indicated:
First, the Court's decision to exclude private action from the binding
effect of the Charter establishes a fundamental principle of Charter interpre-
tation. In my view, this ruling is not only technically correct but is also sound
as a matter of constitutional policy.
Secondly, the Court's decision to exclude a court order from the binding
effect of the Charter establishes another fundamental principle of Charter
interpretation. In my opinion, this ruling is harder to justify on either techni-
cal or policy grounds. However, the controversy surrounding the American
decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, which held that a court order was state
action, demonstrates that this is an area where it is easy for reasonable
people to disagree.
Thirdly, the Court's treatment of the application of the Charter to the
common law is confusing. Probably, the ratio decidendi of the case is that the
Charter does not apply to the rules of the common law that regulate relation-
ships between private parties. While such a ruling produces some anomalies,
it is a defensible answer to a difficult question. The confusion stems from
9 Supra, note 1 at 588. This statement is probably fatal to the.strong version of the
ought statement, because, under the strong version of the ought statement, the
discussion of s. 1 would have been necessary.
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dicta, which seems inconsistent with what I have identified as the ratio
decidendi of the case, and the presence of these dicta makes this part of the
decision ambiguous. 30
Peter W. Hogg*
*Peter W. Hogg, Q.C., of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
30 I acknowledge the help of Professors Andrew Petter and Brian Slattery, who read
an earlier version of this article and made helpful suggestions for its improvement.
PROVOCATION AND THE ORDINARY PERSON: R. v. HILL
Save for one of the litigants, there is a little something for everyone in the
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hill.I The case
concerns the defence of provocation to a charge of murder, which is codified
in s.215 of the Criminal Code.2 At issue were questions of substance and
procedure respecting the objective requirement that the provocation be "suf-
ficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control." For practis-
ing criminal lawyers, the decision amounts to Supreme Court approval of
variance of the objective ordinary person standard even though the variance
need not necessarily be conveyed to a jury. For academic lawyers, the five
judgments provide ample target for intellectual debate. For proponents of the
jury system, there is a ringing defence by Chief Justice Dickson of the
"collective good sense" 3 of jurors. For the Crown, there is the satisfaction of
having a murder verdict upheld. It is only for poor Mr. Hill that the decision
represents a setback.
I. THE FACTS AND THE ISSUES
Hill was sixteen years of age in December 1979, when he caused the
death of Verne Pegg and was charged with first degree murder. The Crown
and the defence theories differed greatly. The Crown sought to prove that the
two were homosexual lovers, that there had been a falling out and that Hill
killed Pegg as a result. Hill maintained that he, while sleeping, had been the
subject of unwelcome homosexual advances by Pegg, whom he knew
through the "Big Brothers" organization. Hill's version was that he struck
Pegg with a hatchet in an attempt to scare him off, that he had fled, and then
returned to check upon Pegg's condition. Threatened again by Pegg, he
stabbed him to death with two knives. He argued self-defence and provoca-
tion. The jury rejected both defences and convicted him of second degree
murder. His appeal was allowed by the Ontario Court of Appeal on the
ground of misdirection with respect to provocation and a new trial was
ordered.4 However, on further appeal by the Crown, the Supreme Court of
Canada, by a six-three majority, reinstated the second degree murder
conviction.
1 (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 322 (S.C.C.).
2 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 215.
3 Supra, note 1, at 335.
4 R. v. Hill (1982), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 396 (Ont. C.A.).
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